Reported by Miad Maleki
(Summary shared below. To read full report, go to: https://www.wsj.com/opinion/a-buyout-for-irans-shadow-fleet-82749edc)
The U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on 17 Iranian shadow-fleet vessels on Oct. 8, targeting tankers used to transport Iranian crude oil, petroleum and petrochemical products to foreign markets. Less than a week later, the administration was reportedly considering easing restrictions on individual vessels to increase oil-shipping capacity and reduce soaring freight rates. Miad Maleki, a former Treasury official, argues that Washington should avoid broadly lifting sanctions and instead allow selected tankers to be sold to U.S.-aligned operators.
The proposal comes as the U.S. naval blockade has sharply reduced the value of Iran-dedicated tankers. Ship-tracking firm Kpler reported that Iran loaded no crude oil onto ships at its export terminals in September. Although Kpler identified about 160 supertankers under U.S. sanctions, roughly 70% were less than 20 years old, and only around two dozen could return to mainstream commercial shipping. Maleki argues that these vessels could still serve a practical purpose by transporting Gulf crude through the Strait of Hormuz, where war-risk insurance costs 7.5% to 10% of a vessel’s hull value and supertanker rentals can reach $1.3 million per day.
Under the proposed approach, legitimate operators would purchase operational shadow-fleet tankers and use them for Hormuz shuttle runs, provided the change in ownership qualified the vessels for sanctions relief. The oldest ships could be scrapped. Maleki says mainstream operators already serving the route would have an incentive to buy these vessels if a sale restored access to insurance and financing. Washington would also work with flag states and shipping registries to ensure that legitimate transfers of ownership become the route back to commercial operations.
The commentary argues that sanctions alone do not always force companies to abandon prohibited trade. When owners lose access to mainstream banking, insurance and registries, they may turn to buyers willing to accept sanctions risk. Maleki cites China’s Yulong Petrochemical, which faced British and European Union sanctions in October 2025. After BP, Saudi Aramco and other suppliers canceled shipments, Russian crude reportedly increased from 40% to 50% of Yulong’s intake before becoming most, if not all, of its supply.
Maleki draws on his eight years at the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, where vessels and companies were sometimes removed from sanctions lists after changing hands. He also points to the recent delisting of two container ships sold to U.S.-aligned operators. His recommendation is to expand that case-by-case approach: recruit legitimate buyers for Iran’s shadow-fleet tankers, restore access to commercial services only after qualifying ownership changes, and direct the oldest vessels toward scrapping. Rather than dismantling sanctions, he argues, Washington should use the blockade to make Iran’s illicit shipping business unviable and redirect suitable vessels into legitimate trade.
