Reported by Ben Lucas

(Summary featured below. To read full report, go to: https://www.thetimes.com/uk/london/article/shelton-street-money-laundering-5mmdjb6f6?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfiGxVMk7sxR3kOER2PO-kE2Ure9qxBhYAemYpRf3xCYVEW8RWdBQtL&gaa_ts=694e790e&gaa_sig=bYH-p6seQsK9AmvojemZEo-xVTET2IGmKOeAMtQF_Gx_AvGlVnGPGX3Zftj-_d45JjnmIXtxg6bD6MOBspSaPw%3D%3D)

The article examines how a single London address — 71–75 Shelton Street in Covent Garden — has become the registered office for more than 85,000 UK companies, raising growing concerns among law enforcement and financial-crime experts. While using a registered office address is legal and often practical, the sheer concentration of firms at a handful of locations has turned these addresses into magnets for abuse, creating opacity that criminals can exploit to disguise illicit activity.

Authorities warn that mass registration addresses are being used to launder money by giving fraudulent or short-lived companies a veneer of legitimacy. The UK’s national financial-crime risk assessment describes widespread abuse of lawful corporate structures, and the National Crime Agency estimates more than £100 billion is laundered annually through the UK. Trust and company service providers (TCSPs), which supply these addresses, are rated high risk due to their role in enabling rapid, low-cost company formation with limited scrutiny.

Data shows Shelton Street is the most popular incorporation address in the country, with tens of thousands of new companies registered there each year. Similar “company factory” addresses exist elsewhere in London, and firms linked to these locations appear disproportionately on HMRC tax-avoidance lists, the FCA’s warning register of unauthorized firms, sanctions listings, and fraud investigations. Companies registered at these addresses also tend to have significantly shorter lifespans, suggesting frequent use as disposable “burner companies.”

Experts argue that the problem is not the address itself, but the scale and speed of incorporations, which overwhelm meaningful due diligence. High volumes make it easier for criminals to hide among legitimate businesses, frustrate monitoring by banks and regulators, and weaken transparency around beneficial ownership. Despite being subject to anti-money-laundering rules, TCSPs file an extremely small share of suspicious activity reports compared with banks, raising doubts about the effectiveness of oversight.

Recent reforms, including identity verification for directors and beneficial owners and plans to shift AML supervision of TCSPs to the FCA, are expected to shrink the register and improve controls. However, campaigners stress that enforcement remains weak, penalties are low, and prosecutions rare. The article concludes that without tougher supervision and accountability for company formation agents, mass registration addresses will continue to function as structural blind spots in the UK’s fight against financial crime.